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ers to notables. For these reasons, Charles 
Wilkins study should now be part of all 
bibliographies on Aleppo and on Ottoman 
urban societies.
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Davide Rodogno’s “Against Massacre” ex-
plores European humanitarian interven-
tions in the late Ottoman Empire, the 
principal site for such interventions. The 
interventions are part of a larger history of 
Ottoman-European interaction that came 
to its climax in the ‘last and longest Ot-
toman century’, in which time frame the 
book is placed. These efforts were launched 
in the name of a common humanity with 
victims of atrocities. The victims supported 
by armed intervention were, however, ex-
clusively Christian groups; others, includ-
ing Muslims and Jews, Alevis and Druze, 
could at best case profit from humanitar-
ian aid or some diplomatic steps.
One reason for this was that Ottoman 
Christians possessed little or no military, 
political, and symbolic power in a Muslim 
empire and, once suspected as disloyal or 
in open revolt, were crushed by the state, 
regional lords, or armed locals. This was 
not the case when Muslims – for instance, 
Kurdish chiefs – rebelled, because the 
Porte and provincial Muslims did not con-
sider that the latter’s acts fundamentally 
questioned Ottoman Muslim legitimacy. 
This larger asymmetry of power must be 
kept in mind when seeking ‘balanced’ ac-
counts of massacres, and in such instances 
as when, as Rodogno rightly insists, British 
prime minister Benjamin Disraeli rhetori-
cally reduced large-scale massacres to local 
disturbances in order to avoid the call to 
humanitarian intervention.
Another reason for pro-Christian inter-
vention was cultural and religious. The 
Ottoman world, ruled by Muslims, was 
not considered to be part of the ‘civilized’, 
de facto culturally Christian family of na-
tions that intervened in the 19th century 
in the name of humanity. Even when dire 
situations called for action, there was a 
fundamental problem of how to conceive 
of a common humanity; cultural and reli-
gious rifts penetrated modern humanitar-
ian discourse. Rodogno is perspicacious in 
insisting on the centrality of the modern 
Eastern Question for understanding hu-
manitarian intervention. He could even 
have elaborated further on the modern 
European projection of humanity “in 
negative” that pointed at foreign Ottoman 
“lèse-humanité” but remained unable to 
produce a positive global project of and 
for humanity.
In his first two chapters, Rodogno elabo-
rates on the exclusion of the Ottoman 
world, the roots of and conditions for in-
tervention in the Holy Alliance of 1815, 
the latter‘s notion of a Christian family of 
civilized nations, and the nineteenth-cen-
tury context of humanitarian intervention 
in the Ottoman Empire. His analysis is 
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instructive but could have been more to 
the point. The Ottoman Reform Edict 
of 1856, in a somewhat utopian fashion, 
intended to empower and modernize (not 
to abolish, as Rodogno suggests p. 27) the 
aterritorial autonomy of the “millet”, that 
is Christian and Jewish communities, and 
to implement Ottoman supra-religious 
identity and individual equality.
Many Westerners set high expectations on 
a reformed Ottoman future after 1839, 
when the Tanzimât began. American mis-
sionaries who had been scandalized by the 
U.S. Indian Removal of the 1830s hoped 
for a bright future in a reformed Ottoman 
world, while they saw their homeland 
marked by slavery, inequality, and other 
injustices. Rodogno assimilates a bit too 
quickly missionary appeals to humanity 
and to elementary rights for non-Chris-
tians and non-Westerners with goals of 
expansion and imperialism (pp. 180–81). 
The notion of an ‘entire humanity’, indi-
vidual and collective, was present and ar-
ticulated in missionary, anti-slavery, and 
diplomatic circles. But politically, it was 
not operable. In 1856, with the end of the 
Holy Alliance, the Ottoman Empire be-
came part of the European system of pow-
ers. By doing so, however, it had to embark 
in its interior towards a utopia of plurality 
cum equality that had nowhere else been 
realized, especially not if one includes the 
colonial realms of European states.
The intervention on behalf of the Otto-
man Greeks (chap. 3), before the Tanzimât 
began is a good example of what was op-
erable in Europe under Restoration: com-
mon nominal Christianity, the venerable 
heritage of ancient Greece, and, with this, 
half clichéd, half all-too-true descriptions 
of Greek Christian suffering and Ottoman 
Muslim repression – in which, however, a 
number of anti-Muslim atrocities scarcely 
figured. Against the background of the end 
of the Holy Alliance, the Crimean War, 
and the Reform Edict, the intervention in 
Ottoman Lebanon of 1860–61 (chap. 4) 
differed markedly from its predecessors. 
Asymmetrical clashes between Maroni-
tes on the one side and Druze and Sunni 
Muslims on the other had taken place, and 
the local authorities had behaved poorly, 
remaining spectators to the events.
Although previous cultural factors were 
not obliterated, the Ottoman reform-
ist emphasis now played a strong role. 
Mehmed Fuad, one of the foremost Tanz-
imât pashas, was sent from Istanbul to 
restore order and punish perpetrators. He 
was joined by French and British commis-
sioners and expeditionary forces. Despite 
frictions, consensus could be established – 
in contrast to the late nineteenth century, 
when the European powers proved unable 
to give common responses to massacres of 
higher magnitude.
A significant reorganisation and fruit of 
the Tanzimât resulted from the turmoil in 
1860–61. The Règlement for the Lebanon 
was based on local, central, and interna-
tional procedures and participation. It pro-
vided Mount Lebanon a peace that lasted 
up to the First World War. This was not 
the case with a similar reorganisation for 
Crete (chap. 5) in the second half of the 
1860s, when intercommunity tensions, the 
absence of reforms, and separatist Greek 
nationalism combined to inspire a rebel-
lion, and European warships intervened to 
save Christian refugees before diplomacy 
found a solution. The grand-vizier Ali 
Pasha, however, architect of the Reform 
Edict of 1856, then felt abused, criticizing 
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a so-called humanitarian intervention that 
discriminated according to religion and, in 
his eyes, hindered the state in legitimately 
suppressing the rebellion in time.
Despite the notorious Bulgarian atrocities, 
humanitarian intervention became politi-
cally impossible during the Eastern crisis 
in the second half of the1870s. Britain un-
der Disraeli feared that Russia would prof-
it and the Ottoman Empire be weakened. 
Although the sensibilities of the public at 
home and a pro-Bulgarian and, later, a 
pro-Armenian movement played an im-
portant role, these could not overcome ba-
sic considerations of foreign policy. Unsur-
prisingly, the balance of power on the peak 
of the Great Game weighed more than the 
interests of a common humanity; and, fur-
ther, the notion of such humanity itself, in 
which to believe, was largely lost.
Once more an Eastern crisis became a 
historical watershed. It coincided with 
the end of the Tanzimât utopia; the end-
ing ‘concert’ of the European powers; the 
beginning of German “Orientpolitik”; the 
rise of anti-Semitism; and, more generally, 
the triumph of ethno-religious and racial 
categories in European and late Ottoman 
political thinking. Rodogno does well to 
consecrate one chapter to this crisis (chap. 
6) and another to the changed interna-
tional context afterwards, during the Belle 
Époque (chap. 7). 
In contrast to the 1860s, the “fin de siècle” 
saw the dizzying phenomenon of nonin-
tervention and no sustained effort toward 
reform when 100,000 Armenians were 
murdered by mostly local protagonists in 
autumn 1895 in Anatolia (chap. 8). The 
Berlin Treaty, which humiliated the Rus-
sian victor of the preceding war with the 
Ottoman Empire, had called for reforms 
in article 61, but Britain, its main pro-
moter, was unable to enforce reforms in 
the Kurdo-Armenian eastern provinces. 
After 1895, under the British prime min-
ister Viscount Cranborne, Marquess of 
Salisbury, Britain was even isolated as the 
only power then willing to intervene for 
manifestly humanitarian reasons.
Comparatively small interventions for 
peace enforcement and reform, but not 
massacre prevention, took place in Crete in 
1896–1900 (chap. 9) and, on a diplomatic 
level, in Macedonia in 1903–8 (chap. 10). 
Only near the end of the twentieth centu-
ry did a new international consensus again 
allow organizing armed interventions for 
mainly humanitarian reasons, and this 
time also for Muslims in the post-Otto-
man world.
“Against Massacre” culminates by narrat-
ing the European aporia with regard to the 
Armenian massacres. It is a strength of this 
book that it shows in poignant detail how 
Belle Époque Europe failed to act according 
to its former basic notions, even in such a 
clear-cut case of mass murder(although the 
Ottoman state, against multiple evidences, 
denied crimes in order to delegitimize 
any call to intervention). Intervention in 
Anatolia would, however, have required 
important military means, a consensual 
international organization, and especially 
faith in common humanity. This last no 
longer existed after the former, implicitly 
Christian understanding of humanity and 
solidarity had largely vanished among Eu-
ropean elites, and with rare exceptions, 
international socialism remained silent 
about what was going on in the Ottoman 
world. Thinkers in international law and 
human rights began to fill the void but 
where powerless. It is another strength of 
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the book to unearth such contemporary 
secular voices.
“Against Massacre” is a major contribution 
to a history of humanitarianism. Based on 
a multitude of Western sources, it profits 
from the new researches on late Ottoman 
history. It in 1914, before the final Otto-
man cataclysm and the Armenian geno-
cide, and also before the implementation 
of reform based on article 61 of the Berlin 
Treaty in spring 1914, when a core issue 
of the Eastern Question shortly seemed 
to be resolved. This final Ottoman drama 
and the input it gave to twentieth-century 
thinking about international law, the anti-
genocide convention, and humanitarian 
intervention would be material enough for 
another book.
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Der Hitler-Stalin-Pakt vom 23. August 
1939 ist für die Gesellschaften Ostmit-
teleuropas einer der wichtigsten „lieux 
de mémoire“, während er in den Erinne-
rungskulturen Westeuropas weitgehend 
ignoriert wird. Somit fügt er sich ein in 
die Reihe erinnerungskultureller Phäno-
mene, die immer noch von der Teilung 
Europas 1945–1989 bestimmt werden. 
Im Einflussbereich der Sowjetunion durfte 
der Pakt bis 1989, wenn überhaupt, dann 
nur ohne Erwähnung des Geheimen Zu-
satzprotokolls thematisiert werden. Dieses 
aber stellt das zentrale Dokument in die-
sem Zusammenhang dar, teilte es doch die 
Staaten Mittel- und Osteuropas unterei-
nander auf und antizipierte somit bereits 
den sicherheitspolitischen Einflussbereich 
der Sowjetunion nach 1945. Der Hitler-
Stalin-Pakt stellt in diesem Kontext einen 
zentralen Kristallisationspunkt für die 
Erinnerungskulturen vieler Europäer dar. 
Dies liegt unter anderem daran, dass „mit 
dem Pakt […] die Totalitarismustheorie ih-
ren Anfang […] nimmt“, wie die Autoren 
in der Einleitung (S. 11) bemerken. Be-
reits hier wird deutlich, dass der Sammel-
band, herausgegeben von Anna Kamins-
ky, Geschäftsführerin der Bundesstiftung 
Aufarbeitung sowie den beiden Leipziger 
Historikern Dietmar Müller und Stefan 
Troebst, ein zutiefst politisches Buch ist. 
Multiperspektivisch nähert sich die Publi-
kation in 24 Beiträgen auf über 550 Seiten 
dem Hitler-Stalin-Pakt als Erinnerungsort 
im Sinne Pierre Noras. Es ist ein Erinne-
rungsort der nahezu idealtypisch die ge-
schichtspolitischen Aushandlungsprozesse 
und Deutungskämpfe um die europäische 
Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts aufzeigt. 
Der Mehrwert dieses Bandes liegt vor allem 
in der Zusammenstellung unterschied-
licher nationaler europäischer Perspektiven 
auf das Ereignis und seiner Konstruktion 
in Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspoli-
tik – eine Multiperspektivität, die in der 
Erinnerungsliteratur bisher eher vernach-
lässigt wurde.1 Weniger das Ereignis selbst, 
als vielmehr die Geschichtsschreibung über 
den Hitler-Stalin-Pakt sowie die staatliche 
Geschichtspolitik und Erinnerungskul-
